Short-lived agent context
Agents run unprivileged in ephemeral sandboxes without ambient credentials. Authenticated assessments still need separately scoped target access. Agree the handling and removal of test credentials before the run.
Governance & Safety Architecture
SWARM investigates real attack paths. We constrain that work with checks before execution, restricted action modes and isolated agent runtimes. Your team agrees the targets, access and environment so the proof matches the risk you are willing to test.
FailSafe Product & Research · Editorial update: 2 November 2026
No security test is risk-free. Controls, permitted actions and coverage are confirmed for the chosen deployment and engagement.
From a proposal to an action
A model can suggest an action that exceeds the intended task. Our approach combines the agreed scope with controls around execution and the environment. The command gate and sandbox carry different responsibilities; both need to be understood before a run.
01
Agree targets, identities, permitted actions, excluded services, request budgets and stop conditions. A linked service or a page the agent discovers does not grant permission to test it.
Engagement boundary
02
The command gate inspects proposed execution, including request content. In Safe mode, recognized destructive and state-changing operations are blocked before that action runs.
Documented execution control
03
An unprivileged, short-lived sandbox limits the agent’s local operating context. Keep assessment access scoped; a sandbox does not establish the target’s network boundary.
Documented execution control
04
Begin with read-only confirmation and collect the evidence needed to explain the finding. Reserve deeper execution for the authorized environment and mode.
Proof strategy
Match the proof to the environment
Safe mode restricts how an agent can confirm a weakness. Cyber mode supports deeper validation on an isolated target. Authorization for deeper testing changes the permitted actions; known irreversible destructive operations remain blocked.
| Boundary | Safe mode | Cyber mode |
|---|---|---|
| Purpose | Read-only-first assessment with restricted actions. | Deeper exploit validation on an explicitly authorized, isolated target. |
| Execution gate | Reviews proposed commands, including request parameters and bodies, against recognized destructive operations and the request-rate cap. | Authorization permits broader writes and mutations. Known irreversible destructive operations remain blocked. |
| State changes | Blocks configured mutation methods, form submissions and brute-force tooling. Start with the smallest read-only proof. | May change the target state as part of an authorized validation. Agree the expected artifacts and recovery plan. |
| Execution environment | Agents run without elevated privileges in ephemeral sandboxes with no ambient credentials. | The same execution isolation applies. Target credentials, where needed, are separately scoped for the assessment. |
| Target environment | Confirm suitability for the application, access, permitted methods and operational risk before production use. | Requires a target you own or are authorized to test, isolated from production, with hard network-egress restrictions. |
| Coverage limits | Some exploit paths remain unexecuted. Record those limits in the findings. | A completed exploit supplies stronger evidence for that path. It does not establish complete coverage or eliminate all false positives. |
When an exploit executes on a target, it can inherit that target’s network access. The execution sandbox does not itself restrict the target’s outbound traffic. Cyber mode requires hard egress restrictions and isolation from production, agreed and verified before testing.
Prove enough to act
In Safe mode, the agent is instructed to start with read-only confirmation. Where appropriate, an approved benign signal can establish reachability without extending the test into a more disruptive action. Some paths remain unexecuted under those limits, and the report should make that coverage boundary clear.
Deeper validation can establish whether a particular path is exploitable in the isolated test environment. Preserve the preconditions, observed effect and limitations, then retest the relevant path after remediation. A successful exploit does not establish complete coverage.
The gate inspects commands and request content for recognized prohibited operations. Safe mode also restricts configured mutations, form submissions, brute-force tooling and requests above the cap.
Pattern checks have limits: they do not understand every payload’s intent or every effect a request may trigger. Ordinary-looking input can still have consequences in the application.
Read how we separate proposals from executionData, identity and model processing
Agents run unprivileged in ephemeral sandboxes without ambient credentials. Authenticated assessments still need separately scoped target access. Agree the handling and removal of test credentials before the run.
Use managed SaaS or scope a fully local deployment that keeps sensitive workloads, model processing and evidence inside your enterprise environment. Verify egress, telemetry, support and fallback paths for that design.
Customer assessment data is not used for model training or fine-tuning by default. Any such use requires explicit customer permission. Confirm retention, deletion, access and applicable providers for your configuration.
Local inference and action safety serve different purposes. Review the sovereign deployment options alongside the execution and target-network controls.
Containment Controls
Use this checklist with the provider and system owner. Confirm the actual technical controls, test scope, and responsibilities before authorizing any activity.
List approved domains, IP ranges, accounts, APIs, and environments. Confirm technical scope controls and excluded assets with the provider before testing.
Ask how test credentials are transmitted, stored, accessed, rotated, and removed. Use least-privilege test accounts and avoid sharing production secrets unless the engagement requires them.
Review the contract and current data-processing terms for code, prompts, findings, telemetry, subprocessors, model providers, retention, and deletion before providing sensitive data.
Agree on request limits, prohibited actions, timing, monitoring, and stop conditions. Staging environments can reduce operational risk for deeper or state-changing tests.
Confirm what activity records and finding evidence will be delivered, how long they are retained, who can access them, and how sensitive details will be protected.
Name the customer and provider contacts who can pause a run, how to reach them, and what operational signals require testing to stop.
Environment Guidelines
Production testing can affect availability or data. Use it only with written authorization, an agreed test window, defined request limits, monitoring, and named contacts who can stop the run.
Staging can reduce operational risk for deeper tests. Confirm it matches production behavior and contains no live customer data or credentials unless specifically authorized.
Keep authority separate from target content
An assessment encounters pages, responses and tool output that can contain misleading instructions. That material is test data. A request to reveal secrets, change the testing mode or reach a different service does not grant permission to do so.
The documented command gate checks proposed execution and request content against the configured restrictions. The assessment’s approved scope and mode remain the basis for what is permitted, regardless of how an agent arrived at a proposal.
Prompt manipulation is a reason to review the composed workflow, including credentials and reachable systems. We do not claim that an instruction filter or pattern gate eliminates every injection or bypass risk.
Operation and improvement
We continue to harden sandbox isolation and payload handling. For an enterprise assessment, agree how the current configuration will be demonstrated and reviewed, including the controls that pause work and the evidence available afterward.
Confirm permitted and blocked actions, request limits, excluded destinations, access and the chosen mode on a representative environment. Name the people authorized to stop the assessment.
Unexpected state changes, target instability, account lockouts or signs of scope drift are reasons to stop and review. Agree monitoring, escalation and pause/resume behavior before the assessment; response timing is configuration-specific.
Review the available activity records, observed findings, blocked or unexecuted paths and test artifacts. Confirm cleanup responsibilities, credential revocation and the evidence needed for a remediation retest.
Review stop controls and evidence availability against your deployment before authorizing a run.
Understand the controls
How SWARM’s action modes, execution gate and isolation constrain the path from reasoning to execution.
Read the guide →Separate the agent runtime, the target’s network and the location of model inference.
Read the guide →A practical review of scope, request limits, proof methods, stop conditions and evidence.
Read the guide →Regulatory & Framework Alignment
Testing may support evidence
An independent CPA examination and report on controls at a service organization.
Not a certification service
Requirements for an information security management system.
Confirm scope with assessor
PCI DSS contains penetration-testing requirements for applicable environments.
Confirm applicability
Technology risk guidance for financial institutions in Singapore.
Use where relevant to scope
Risk management references for AI systems and adversarial testing.
Contact FailSafe to confirm available security documentation, data handling terms, and whether a proposed test fits your compliance evidence needs. Review our compliance pentesting scope and offer for related testing requirements.
1
on CVE-Bench v2.1.0
Ranked first in our September 2026 comparison of reported CVE-Bench v2.1.0 results. Attempt budgets differ; outcomes are stochastic and do not establish production coverage. See methods and limits.
48h
from vulnerability scanning to code remediation
Deploy agents, build threat models, reproduce findings, connect ITSM and open remediation PRs within 48 hours of agreed access and integration readiness. Your team approves changes.
Local
Own your inferencing
Own the hosting and the inference. A fully local deployment keeps sensitive workloads, model processing and evidence inside your enterprise environment, with no external model calls.
Questions & answers
Core answers to security, safety, and governance questions regarding FailSafe SWARM.
FailSafe combines an agreed assessment scope with an execution gate, restricted action modes and unprivileged, ephemeral sandboxes. In Safe mode, the gate checks proposed commands and request content for recognized destructive operations, restricted mutations and request-rate violations. Environment and network controls must also match the assessment. No single layer establishes complete safety.
Safe mode takes a read-only-first approach and blocks configured state-changing operations. Cyber mode permits broader authorized exploit validation while retaining a block on known irreversible destructive operations. Cyber requires an isolated, authorized target with hard egress restrictions. It is not a permission to execute unrestricted tests against production.
No. The documented gate recognizes prohibited operations and patterns; it does not establish the intent or every possible effect of arbitrary input. An apparently ordinary request can still trigger application behavior. Scope, environment isolation, request limits and review remain necessary.
No. Runner isolation and target-network containment are separate controls. An exploit can execute inside the target’s own network context. The documented Cyber mode therefore requires production isolation and hard target-egress restrictions; the execution sandbox alone does not supply that restriction.
Sovereign inference controls where model processing takes place in the agreed deployment. It complements execution safeguards, authorization, network containment and evidence handling. A fully local deployment can keep sensitive workloads and model processing inside the enterprise environment; that locality alone does not authorize actions or prevent target-side effects.
No training by default. Use of customer assessment data for model training or fine-tuning requires explicit customer permission. Confirm retention, access, model providers, support access and deletion for the chosen SaaS or sovereign deployment before sharing sensitive material.
No security test is risk-free. Before testing, obtain written authorization, list in-scope and excluded assets, agree on methods and time windows, define rate limits and stop conditions, and identify an operator who can pause the work. Production testing should use only controls confirmed for the specific engagement.
Customer assessment data is not used for model training or fine-tuning by default. Any such use requires explicit customer permission. Confirm the applicable data-processing terms, retention period, access controls, subprocessors, credential handling, and model-training policy with FailSafe before sharing code, credentials, or target data. The contract and current security documentation govern those terms.
A penetration test may provide evidence about technical testing and remediation for a security program. A penetration test does not issue a SOC 2 report or ISO/IEC 27001 certification, and it cannot guarantee that an auditor or certification body will accept particular evidence. Confirm evidence needs with your auditor.
Document the assets and accounts the customer owns or is authorized to test, prohibited targets and actions, test dates, permitted methods, data-handling expectations, escalation contacts, and stop conditions. Verify that the selected technical controls enforce the agreed scope before a run begins.
Choose a human-led or specialist engagement when the scope requires physical testing, custom hardware analysis, social engineering, a named tester's assessment, or methods that an automated system does not support. Confirm the platform's scope and review model before selecting an approach.