Sources checked: . FailSafe Research.
A coordinator may ask another agent to retrieve a document or complete a specialist task. That handoff should not turn a narrow user request into access under the most privileged agent in the system. Consider a customer-support coordinator delegating a question to an internal operations assistant. An assessment should establish which identity and permission set the receiving agent uses, and whether the original user’s scope remains visible at the tool that performs the work.
Delegation scope chain
Draw the delegation chain with the human principal, coordinator, worker, downstream tool, and service account. Define the maximum action and data scope at each hop, including whether a worker can delegate again. Use synthetic users with deliberately different permissions and a controlled restricted record. Ask how task metadata is authenticated and which component enforces expiration and revocation. The organization should state whether delegation may reduce permissions, inherit them, or request an explicit new grant; implicit privilege expansion is not a clear policy.
Your delegation scope chain
Use this compact record in the review. Fill it with synthetic fixtures and the observed result, then retain the configuration with the finding.
| Original request | Delegated identity | Inherited limit |
|---|---|---|
| Approved control case | Record the relevant decision | Record the observed result |
| Denied boundary case | Record the expected refusal | Record any deviation and owner |
Delegate a deliberately narrow request
Run a permitted delegated task and trace the identity that reaches the target resource. Then ask for an owner-approved negative case where the initiating user lacks the required permission although the worker’s service account has it. Include a second delegation hop, a delayed task after revocation, and a missing caller context. Use non-destructive tools and synthetic records. Observe whether the receiving agent merely repeats a scope statement or whether the execution service independently binds the operation to a trusted delegation record.
Trace the inherited identity
Capture task identifiers, initiating user, receiving agent, permitted scope, expiry, downstream decision, and final outcome. Do not publish internal routing details or reusable credentials. The evidence should show which identity made the access decision and whether a failure was caused by a missing identity, excessive service privileges, or an invalid delegation state. If a worker proposed an unauthorized task that a downstream service rejected, describe the attempted expansion and successful denial separately. This keeps architectural risk distinct from demonstrated impact.
Repeat the handoff after remediation
Retest the entire chain after remediation, including legitimate specialist work and revocation during a queued task. New worker agents and shared tool credentials can change the effective permission boundary even when the coordinator stays the same. OWASP authorization guidance is a general reference, while the acceptance matrix must come from the deployed delegation design. Buyers should ask for role and handoff coverage in an AI assessment rather than treating a test of the front-end conversation as coverage of every agent behind it.
Plan this assessment with FailSafe
Use a staging environment, synthetic records, approved test identities, and an agreed stop condition. Record the model, connector, policy, and application versions so a later result can be compared with the same configuration. Unavailable evidence should remain an explicit coverage gap.
Primary reference: OWASP security guidance. The scenarios and acceptance criteria here are editorial recommendations for adapting that background to an authorized assessment.
For a scoped review of these boundaries, explore FailSafe AI security testing and agentic penetration testing. Agree the specific tools, identities, evidence, and exclusions before purchasing an assessment.
Questions & answers
Questions about this topic
Direct answers to common questions about this page.
Only operations explicitly authorized by the application policy should execute. The initiating user’s scope and any delegated grant must be evaluated.
Define a safe failure behavior. Missing trusted identity context should not be interpreted as permission to use a broader default account.
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Put this guidance to work
Bring an AI workflow with its identities and permitted actions. FailSafe can help turn this boundary into an authorized test and a useful remediation record.
Startup offer: $999 USD for 250 credits and one authorized black-box run. Sign in to SWARM before Stripe checkout. Custom scope and sovereign deployments are separate.